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Back to Cold War and beyond 
Instead of Europe overcoming East-West divisions after 1989 as part of a broader pan-
European community, the West embarked on a programme of expansion and Russia then 
began to create an alternative world order. But amid the shift of economic power from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific basin, this is just one aspect of today’s global clash of world 
orders. 
 
The East-West divide is back. The happy hopes at the end of the First Cold War in 1989 
for the historic reconciliation of the continent came to naught. Worse still, an ‘Iron 
Curtain’ is once again being built across the continent, no longer running from Stettin on 
the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic (as Winston Churchill so graphically described it), 
but from Narva in the north to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. The physical frontier is 
reinforced by militarisation, as well as the psychological and political intensification of 
hostilities that in many ways surpasses that of the original Cold War.  
 
There has also been a major shift in perceptions. In the late Soviet years the West came to 
be considered the home of development and ultimately the best model of modernity. The 
countries trapped in the Soviet bloc anticipated a ‘return to Europe’, representing the 
political and ideological reunification of a continent that was perceived to have been 
artificially separated. However, this model of the West as the only viable model of 
progress has given way to disillusionment. For Russia, Europe is no longer considered a 
desirable model, although this does not mean that there is a desire to break all ties. 
Equally, the belief that Russia after communism could join the Western fold has now 
given way to disappointment. The country stubbornly, and for some irrationally, seeks to 
maintain its independent status as a great power and refuses to adapt to the exigencies of 
the Atlantic system as historically constituted in the post-war years. 
 
This new East-West divide is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a Second Cold 
War. Just as the Second World War differed in its geopolitical and ideological postulates 
from the First, so the Second Cold War is not just the continuation of the First. As with 
both twentieth-century world wars, the unresolved problems at the end of the first gave 
rise to the second. In the three decades since 1989, hopes of overcoming the East-West 




1989 as a false dawn 
Europe in 2014 once again entered a period of confrontation and division. For some, this 
represents the onset of a new Cold War, a period of entrenched confrontation 
accompanied by the rhetorical condemnation of the opponent. Others are sceptical, 
arguing that the appropriation of the term ‘cold war’ is an abuse of history that 
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misunderstands the realities of the present situation.2 There is no longer the old 
ideological division between capitalism and communism characteristic of the First Cold 
War, and Russia is just a shadow of the superpower that was once the former Soviet 
Union. However, it is clear that elements of a cold war have returned to Europe, although 
this does not mean the return of the Cold War.3  
 
This is why the idea of a Second Cold War is useful, since it both seeks to identify the 
elements of continuity while revealing what is different. The continuities include the 
militarisation of the frontier between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
Russia in the Baltic, military exercises to prepare for conflict between the two, a nuclear 
stand-off based on the classic postulates of deterrence (above all mutually-assured 
destruction, MAD), accompanied by intense propaganda designed to delegitimize and 
undermine the other. The entire arms control mechanism is being dismantled and 
replaced by the language of ultimatums. In many ways this renewed confrontation is 
more dangerous than the original conflict.4 
 
How did we manage to reproduce a conflict that so many agreements had vowed to 
prevent? My basic argument is that the 25 years of the cold peace between 1989 and 2014 
failed to resolve any of the fundamental problems of European security and political 
identity. For Russia, NATO enlargement represented not only a betrayal of the verbal 
assurances apparently given at the time of German unification in 1990 that the alliance 
would not move ‘one inch to the East’ of the former East German territory, but above all 
represented a reckless provocation that only intensified the security dilemma that it was 
intended to avert. From this perspective, NATO’s existence is justified by the need to 
deal with the consequences of its own existence.5  
 
From the perspective of the Atlantic powers, the enlargement of the zone of peace and 
security would ultimately work to Moscow’s benefit too, avoiding a return to the endless 
inter-war conflicts between small states and the tensions between the great powers. By 
contrast, Russia remained loyal to a Yalta-type vision of great power politics managed by 
the UN Security Council, although this did not imply an attempt to reconstitute 
something akin to the old Soviet bloc. It did mean, however, recognition of Russia’s great 
power interests in the eastern part of Europe and continued status as a great power in 
world affairs. 
 
There have been three major periods of post-war European history. The original Cold 
War lasted from the late 1940s to 1989; followed by a quarter century of the cold peace, 
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in which the European Union and NATO enlarged, but in which Russia became 
increasingly disgruntled; and then after 2014 the full-scale onset of a Second Cold War, 
in which we now find ourselves. This is an era of renewed confrontation, marked by 
sanctions imposed on Russia by the Western powers, while Russia seeks new alignments 
and partnerships in the East. The Ukraine crisis of 2014 was just the catalyst that brought 
out the underlying tensions. Today the militant anti-Russian regime in Kyiv, embittered 
above all by the loss of Crimea, acts as a powerful wedge driving Russia and the West 
even further apart to exacerbate the East-West divide. The combination of geopolitics and 
democratisation since Ukraine became independent in 1991 means that tensions were 
there from the start, paving the way for the dominant model of Ukrainian state building. 
This entails the fundamental rejection of partnership with Russia in favour of a putative 
‘European choice’. 
 
The collapse of the state socialist model of modernity represented by the Soviet system 
did not mean Russia’s seamless return to what Gorbachev-era intellectuals called ‘the 
main highway of history’. It turned out that history has many highways and byways. At 
the end of the Cold War Russia aspired to join the Historical West, but believed that its 
very act of joining would change its character and that through a process of 
transformation a Greater West would emerge.  
 
Russia asserted that it was a senior constitutive member of international society, a 
founding member of the UN and a permanent member of its Security Council, and sought 
to lever this to transform the Historical West into a reconstituted order. Moscow argued 
that it had done more than any other state to end the futile Cold War, and therefore 
deserved some sort of special status in a reconstituted Greater West. The self-willed 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc represented a pledge of Moscow’s bona fides as a 
member of the expanded Western order.  
 
This also applies to the regional context, where Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of a ‘common 
European home’ (today called Greater Europe) would have established a co-operative 
pan-European community. Instead, Moscow was offered guest membership of the 
existing enterprises – the Historical West and the smaller Europe represented by the 
European Union. For historical, status, geographical and security reasons, this type of 
membership was not acceptable – Moscow was not ready to enter into some sort of neo-
colonial apprenticeship to ultimately join the Historical West. From this foundational 
difference all the rest flows.  
 
There was a fundamental incompatibility in perceptions. Moscow claimed a reward for 
ending the Cold War, but that is not how international politics works. From the Western 
perspective, the Soviet Union and then Russia was a failing power. The country had 
exhausted itself in the arms race and its economic and political order was dysfunctional. 
A victory discourse was at first eschewed, but it soon made itself felt. More than that, the 
countries recently liberated from the Soviet yoke sought to hedge against a revival of 
Russian imperial power, and hence clamoured to join Western institutions. The West as a 




made sense to secure its positions while the going was good.6 This did not mean that 
Russia was treated as a defeated power, and numerous initiatives, ranging from the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations of 1997 to the establishment of the 
NATO-Russia Council in 2002, sought to create a framework for interaction. As far as 
Russia was concerned, these were palliatives, intended to soften the failure to transform 
European international relations after the Cold War, and to mitigate the consequences of 
what appeared to be the inexorable advance of the Atlantic power system to Russia’s 
western borders. 
 
There are understandable reasons why the Historical West refused to transform itself 
through Russian membership. There were fears about norm dilution, especially 
concerning human rights; institutional incoherence if Russia joined or became affiliated 
with such bodies as NATO; and concern about the loss of US leadership, especially in 
crisis situations (as in the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia). At the theoretical 
level, the US-led liberal international order effectively claimed to be synonymous with 
international society. In this conception, world order emerges not out of cooperative 
(solidarity-based) inter-state practices regulated by international society, but out of 
American leadership of the liberal international order. The institutions of international 
society and the liberal international order are effectively fused. This does not mean that 
the US-led coalition gets its way all the time – in fact, the UN, as a product of the Yalta 
order, remains a recalcitrant body because of the veto powers wielded by Russia and 
China, as well as their allies in the global South.  
 
This is what gives rise to divergence between multilateral processes and the western 
hegemonic formation. Relations between the US and the UN have been far from easy, 
prompting complaints by US legislators about the disproportionate burden assumed by 
America. The US contributes 22 per cent of the main UN budget and nearly 29 per cent 
of peacekeeping costs. As a result, there have been various attempts to bypass the UN’s 
authority through various ‘coalitions of the willing’, as in Iraq in 2003. The establishment 
of the Community of Democracies in 2000 was also intended to achieve a similar 
autonomy from international society in the normative sphere.  
 
 
From East-West to North-South 
Elements of the Cold War have been restored, but that only describes part of the current 
situation. The Second Cold War is part of a broader shift of power in international 
politics away from the Historic West, and is a symptom of that shift. The renewed 
division of Europe is ultimately only a relatively minor, and undoubtedly archaic, part of 
a global shift in the balance of power and ideology. Although the Second Cold War 
dominates Europe, something far bigger is taking place at the global level. There is a shift 
towards what some call multipolarity but which in practice is broader than that – the 
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transition to a world of multiple spatial and temporal orders (multi-orderness).7 Amitav 
Acharya calls this a ‘multiplex world order’.8 Thus it is fair to talk of a new East-West 
divide, but only if we confine ourselves to Europe.  
 
Recent shifts in international politics reflect deeper changes in global affairs. There is a 
slow but ineluctable structural shift of economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
basin. In particular, the return of China as one of the world’s top economic powers cannot 
but change the structure of global power, reinforced by India rising up the index of 
economic powers. China has now emerged as the only potential peer competitor to 
American hegemony, and for that reason John Mearsheimer predicts that the two will 
inevitably come into conflict. The US will do everything in its power to contain China’s 
rise, while China will consistently push back against the US in the South China Sea and 
elsewhere.9  
 
If the focus is on brute military power, then those who dismiss ‘declinist’ interpretations 
of America’s status are undoubtedly right. The US remains overwhelmingly the 
predominant global power, and this is unlikely to change soon.10 However, we are now 
witnessing an acceleration of the long-term decline of American and Atlanticist 
ideational hegemony, within the West and beyond. The emergence of social movements 
dissatisfied with the neo-liberal hegemony established since the 1970s is reflected in the 
ballot box, including the Brexit vote of 23 June 2016. Often described as ‘populist’ 
challenges, Ernesto Laclau is right to note (drawing in particular on Latin American 
experience) that in conditions of political closure, populism becomes the vernacular in 
which new ideas are articulated to challenge the failings of the ruling system.11 National 
populism represents a challenge from both the left and the right to the economic and 
political relations consolidated after the end of the Cold War.12 
 
On a global scale the old East-West divide no longer makes much sense, since there are 
major new players. The developed North, as politically constituted in the form of the 
Historical West, no longer enjoys its former primacy. If hopes of overcoming the East-
West divide have in part been fulfilled, then it is not in the way envisaged by idealists at 
the end of the Cold War. Instead of Europe overcoming the division by becoming whole, 
accompanied by a pan-continental vision of European unity and leadership in the world, 
the Historical West has expanded and radicalised its vision of itself; while in the East 
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Russia is now at the heart of the creation of an alternative world order. This is based not 
so much on anti-Western positions as on the view that the hegemony of any single order 
leads to distortions and ultimately hubris. The demand is for pluralism in the international 
system, and on this basis Russia and China have forged an anti-hegemonic alignment. 
 
The unipolar moment is giving way to the clash of political orders. This is why the 
Eastern pole in Europe is assuming a Greater Eurasian dimension, and even more 
broadly, becoming part of Greater Asia. The traditional East is becoming part of a 
southern anti-hegemonic alignment. The outlines of such an alternative order were 
apparent at the meeting of the RICs powers (Russia, India and China) on the sidelines of 
the G20 summit in Buenos Aires (30 November–1 December 2018), the first such 
trilateral meeting for twelve years.  
 
Russia has advanced the principle of multipolarity since at least the mid-1990s, and it 
was a central idea of Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister between January 1996 and 
September 1998, and then when he was prime minister until May 1999.13 In fact, the idea 
of a RIC alignment belongs to him, as part of his ‘competitive coexistence’ model of 
post-Cold War international relations (harking back to Nikita Khrushchev’s idea of 
‘peaceful coexistence’). It must be stressed that multipolarity and multi-orderness are not 
the same. Multipolarity refers to multiple centres of power – poles – in the international 
system, all operating according to the same model of politics. Typically, multipolarity is 
examined through a realist, or even geopolitical, lens, with all states seeking to maximise 
their relative position in the anarchical system. This can at times be achieved through 
some sort of concert of powers as established after the Congress of Vienna, and in a 
rather more attenuated form, at Yalta and Potsdam at the close of the Second World War.  
 
A multi-order system is one where there is a different dynamic to the international 
politics of the different orders. The different orders represent different paradigms of the 
international system, with different views about the structure of the system and the 
appropriate behaviour and logic of action. Today we have the US-led liberal international 
order as well as a putative anti-hegemonic alignment encompassing to varying degrees 
Russia, China, India and others states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) association, as well as the 
revived Non-Aligned Movement. Some may even add political Islam as a possible third 
order, with the attempts to recreate a Caliphate in the form of an Islamic State as the most 
vivid manifestation of a radical alternative order. A number of different ‘new world 
orders’ represent different ideas about how political space should be organised on a 
global scale. 
 
The emerging anti-hegemonic alignment refuses to accept the claim of the liberal 
international order that it is synonymous with order itself. Instead, Moscow, Beijing and 
their allies in what used to be called the ‘Third World’ (a putative world order in itself) 
stress the autonomy of the institutions of international society. Issues of human dignity, 
fairness in international trade and finance, and indeed the survival of the planet itself 
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belong to all of humanity, and although the major multilateral institutions were shaped by 
the victorious allies at the end of the Second World War, they represent a universalism 
that cannot be the property of any one order.14 For the new global South (the post-




The Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin asserted that Russia would transform itself 
into a liberal and market democracy, but it would do so in its own way and at its own 
pace. Above all, it argued that the transformation should be mutual, including a 
transformation of the system of European international relations. The West insisted that 
Russia had to transform itself; while Russia riposted that it would do so, but as part of a 
broader transformation. Russia hoped that its membership would transform the Historical 
West (with the Atlantic powers and institutions at its core) into a Greater West in which 
Russia would be a constituent member and thus enjoy all the rights of a co-founder. The 
idea of Greater Europe displaces the idea of the EU as the sole representative of Europe 
in favour of a more plural model, in which the EU would be part of a broader pan-
European community. Both the Greater West and Greater Europe ideas are based on a 
dialogical approach to politics – the view that engagement transforms both subjects. 
Instead, the West tried to stay the same and enlarge (a monological perspective); while 
Russia was to change and assume a new power and normative identity. 
 
The fundamental process at the end of the Cold War became enlargement of the Atlantic 
community. By contrast, Gorbachev and his successors in Russia sought transformation, 
a negotiated end to the institutional and ideational structures of the Cold War in which 
Russia would become a founder member of a new political community. Instead, all that 
was on offer (and as far as the Western powers were concerned, it was quite a lot) was 
associate membership in an existing concern. No one really believed that Russia could 
join NATO without changing the character of the organisation and of the whole Atlantic 
system. There were understandable fears that Russia’s membership would lead not to the 
positive transformation proclaimed by Gorbachev but to a degradation of institutional 
coherence and normative principle. Fully-fledged Russian membership would have meant 
constituent authority and veto powers. In the post-Cold War era there were simply not 
enough western leaders, let alone military planners, ready to take the risk and weaken 
(from their perspective) a functioning enterprise in favour of an uncertain and possibly 
dangerous alliance with Russia. Hence there appeared to be ‘no place for Russia’ in the 
post-Cold War order, giving rise to the cold peace.15 
 
Once it became clear that there would be no transformational politics at the end of the 
Cold War and that the logic of enlargement would prevail, Russia was faced with the 
choice of either adapting to the Historical West and the smaller Europe as a subaltern, or 
of asserting its autonomous great power and normative identity. Yeltsin and Vladimir 
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Putin at first tried to finesse the question by finding some sort of middle course, but in the 
end Putin unequivocally advanced the view that Russia would be an independent 
sovereign power in the international system. This gave rise to a neo-revisionist foreign 
policy: one that remained committed on the vertical axis to the institutions of 
international law and governance, above all the UN; but in horizontal relations with other 
states it challenges the hegemony of the US-led liberal order. This inevitably brought 
Russia into confrontation with the Atlantic system, but now balanced by the creation of 
an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and some other states. The East-West divide is 
back, but it no longer determines international politics. East-West divisions are now only 
a relatively small part of the global clash of world orders.  
 
